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ll1a1·ch 7, 1969

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I
thank the dlst.lnguished Senator from
Missouri. I again express my appreciation to the distinguished Senator from
Maryland <Mr. MATHIAS) for making his
malden speech In such a statesmanlikemanner on one of the most Important
.<ubjects of the day.
Mr. President, before I go into my prepared remarks, I want to say a few
words. In the first place, I want it clearly understood that this is not a political
matter, that there is no partisanship
involved. I think that the debate today
and prior to today, which has included
Members from both sides of the aisle,
emphasizes that fact. Second, as far as I
am concerned personally, I wish to state
for the record that I had grave doubts
in my mind about the ABM during the
previous 2 years of a Democratic administration under President Johnson. I
have grave doubts today, also.
I am not one of those who think that
an American citizen who wears a star,
or two or three or four stars, on his
shoulder, should be automatically
branded as a brass hat and as someone
who does not have the interest of the
country at heart. I think that has been
a caricature of the military. I think that
the military by and large is trying to do
what they can, as they see the situation,
1n the interest and the security of the
country.
The fact that we may differ with them
from time to time In no way should be
cause for denegration of dedicated service.
The questions I have raised about the
particular proposal under discussion, the
ABM, has to do with the cost-the accurate cost and not a guess or an assumption-with the validity, the accuracy, of the system, and whether it is
already obsolescent.
I think It should be emphasized that
those of us who nave raised questions
about the ABM have, to the best of my
knowledge, unanimously advocated a
continuing research and development
program to the end that If such a system., became necessary, we would have
the 'best possible one at our disposal.
Incidentally, If I were certain that the
program were necessary, I would vote for
every dime required to put it Into operation.
I also have some questions about the
Soviet ABM system, the Galosh, around
Moscow, which may be a system on which
work has stopped entirely, or which may
be a system which is quite ineffective.
Then, of course, there is the Tallln system along the northern coast, which I
understand is not an A.BM system in any
sense of the word but Is an aircraft defense system.
There Is also the question of the
U.S. and U.S.S.R. negotiations I recall, as I have several times. the statement by the President, Mr. Nixon, in his
inauguration address, in which he
stressed negotiation- and not confrontation. And I believe tbat what he has done
to date Indicates that he meant it.
Then I have to weigh against each
other the internal security of this oountry and its external security. It is a balance which we must maintain 1n some

..

way, because we could become far
stronger than we are at the present time
in our external security and far weaker
in our internal security as it Is Involved
in the difficult and dangerous situations
which have become so apparent In our
urban areas and In our tural areas as
well.
Mr. President <Mr. CooK in the chair),
the deployment of the Sentinel antiballistic-missile system does not boil
down to the question of whether or not
dangerous hardwar(' should be placed
close to or dist ant from the densely
inhabited locations of the Nationwhether in urban or rural settings. The
decision involves much more. It involves
more, even, than the initiation of another round of a tmaments escalation.
Important as t hese considerations may
be, the ramifications of this issue reach
f ar beyond them .
The decision for or a gainst. deployment
of the Sent inel, in present circumstances,
may well determine the basic direction
of public leadership for a decade or more.
U we decide to go ahead with this project, as we have done in other more affluent times with other weapons systems of
questionable value, the decision can only
be seen as a continuance of both the
practices and the priorities of the past.
It will be seen. properly, as an inability
to escape from the shackles of our own
rhetoric. Having spoken so long and so
loudly of a distant danger, we are not
able to hear the rising voice of need at
hand. We are unable to do other than
keep the emphasis of our national efforts
on costly military systems as we have
for the past two decades. We are not able
to shift gears despite the serious Inner
difficulties which loom ahead.
Yet it is t hese inner difficulties, 1n my
judgment, which prese11t the Nation with
the clearest a nd most imminent danger.
The multibillion-dollar Sentinel does not
meet these difficulties any more than
Vietnam has met them . On the contrary,
it, too. may well act oo intensify them.
As I have indicated, the Sentinel is
not the first costly and dubious new
weapons system which has been brought
to the attention of the Senate durlng the
past two decades. What Is new at this
moment is our altered capacit y to take
on a great expenditure of questionable
value in the light of the other demands
which are being made on the tax-burdened and lnftation-pressed citizens of
the Nation. Quite apart from the technioal shortcomings of the Sentinel, its
deployment would be, In my opinion, a
movement of the Nation's leadership In
the wrong direction and at the wrong
time. Sentinel will not add one iota to
the security of life In the United States.
It may well det ract from it.
Let me illustrate the point. Since the
near catastrophe of the Cuban missile
ctisis, in 1962, nuclear weapons seem to
me to have been eliminated e.s a practical alternative in the International
strategy of both the Soviet Union and
the United States. It did not require a
written a greement to confirm this understanding. The message came through
loud and clear, from the brink of nuclear annihilation. We learned and, I belieVe, they learned that a relevant sur-

vi va! for both count.ricll ancl the world depended upon neit.hcr nat.lon <'nt.crlng on
any path of policy which. in t.he end. had
to lead to nuclear confron ta tion. The
Cuban crisis when cu\\plcd wit.h t.he Nuclear Test Ban T reuty has provided a
res pite of m a n y years from the pressure
of ever-incipient nuclear conflict between the Soviet Union and the United
States.
In my judgmen t. t h e deployment of a
Sentinel ABM system would once a gain
open up a period of grave uncertainty.
It would tend to revit alize the use of nuclear weaponry as a component of the
international strategy of the United
States and the Soviet Union. Moreover,
it would have that effect without benefit to either n ation but with increased
risks to the survival of both.
That such is the case is indicated by
the so-called action-reaction pattern
of strategic armament, as·it has operated
between the two cotmtries over the years.
For two decades or more, when the Soviet Union has acted by making a weapons advance which imbalances the nuclear equations between the two countries, we have reacted by an advance in
order to maintain the balance of terror.
In the same fashion, the Soviet Union
has responded to our nuclear advances.
Even if the action-reaction process is
recognized as necessary to the maintenance of a precarious peace of mutual
terror, it does not follow that it Is being
applied in a relevant fashion In the context of the ABM Issue. It is argued, for
example, that since the Soviet Union is
deploying an ABM system around Moscow, we must respond with the Sentinel
ABM system. However. the relevant reaction to the deployment of a Soviet
ABM is not necessarily an identical action on our part but rather a balancing
action. We have, In fact, already responded to the Soviet ABM system. In
the fully developed MffiV system we will
have assured that whatever defense the
Soviet Union might build in the way of
an ABM structure, let alone what has
actually been deployed, our capacity to
penetrate it will be more than sufficient.
To respond, now, a second time by putting into place an American ABM system-that is, by deploying the Sentinelis not a relevant res'ponse. It is, rather,
the opening of another round of nuclear
escalation.
Under the action-reaction formula , the
deployment of the Sentinel should and
undoubtedly would precipitate a relevant
response from the Soviet Union, regardless of the testimony to da te. The Russians may be expected to increase even
further t h eir offensive capacity in order
to assure penetration of the Sentinel defense. By deploying the latter. in short.
we will have put ourselves In the ironic
position of stimulating the expansion of
the over-all offensive capabilities of the
Soviet Union against the American
people.
Recent statements in favor of deploym ent indicate the possibility that an alternative plan of deployment for the Sentinel will be offered in the near future.
As I understand the new concept, the
chief protection of the system will be
transferred from the vicinity of great
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cities to the remote ICBM missile sites.
Instead of offering protection to people
which obviously it cannot do, the Sentinel is now pro.I)06ed as a missile to protect other missiles. To put it another way,
the Sentinel deployment is about to be
billed not as a safeguard for our cities
but of our deterrent capacity in the event
of an attack against the United States.
To what degree is this additional protect' on of the deterrent actually necessary?
I s th re any question about the adequacy-the enormous adequacy-of our
p resent deterrence? Indeed, the accumulation is already so immense as to be almost beyond calculation . It is many times
what anyone can perceive as necessary
for the total destruction not only of the
Soviet Union but of the entire structure
of civilization. Moreover. the d elivery
systems for this great power are multiple
in number and widely dispersed. So I repeat is there any question about the sufficiency of our present deterrent? Why is
it necessary, then, to add the Sentinel
protection?
To shift the Sentinel from the population -.;enters may allay the current concern of the residents thereof about the
dangers of accidental disaster. The shift
may make it easier to get legislation for
sentinel through the Congress. I repeat,
however , what value does Sentinel as it is
now proposed to deploy it, add to an already bulging over-loaded arsenal of deterrence? Beyond the emplaced missiles
of ICBM have we forgotten the deterrent
effect of the P olaris submarine fleet ?
Neverth eless, if further assured deterrent
capability of the land-based ICBM is
really needed, would not an additional
hardening 0f the sites be equally or more
effective than trying to protect them with
other missiles?
It has been said last year and again
this year. in effect, that Sentinel deployment will mprove our bargaining position with the Soviet Union. It will make
it easier, il is contended, to bring about
mut ual disarmament. The fact is that for
more than two decades, every major
escalation in the arms race, every significant new addition to the nuclear arsenals has been introduced with precisely
the same assurances--that somehow a
movement forward in armament will produce agreement on disarmament. It is
now 25 years later. Where are the disarmament agreements which the expansion of armaments were to produce? A
quarter of a century later, where is there
one such agreement on a reduction of
armaments? The fact is that not a single
nuclear weapon has been dismantled on
the basis of a disarmament agreement
be tween th•! Soviet Union and the United
States. So let us at least have the good
sense to reason from this exper•ence that
whatever its other merit or d. merit, Sentinel is hardly an instrumen ., for bringing about disarmament.
Tile Sentinel system is already, admittedly, dated-dated back to 1962, as I
recall. It is readily acknowledged that it
will not work against a Soviet attack.
Nevertheless, it is contended it will be
useful against the Chinese. This contention presupposes not one irrational Chinese decision but two. In the first place
the Chinese wduld have to make theirrational decision to launch a dubiously

effecti'll'e nuclear attack upon us with
their ID06t inadequate nuclear 1esources
even though it would bring great re ..
talia.tory destruction to their homeland.
This initial irrationality, however, would
then have to be coupled with an irrational Chinese choice of delivery systems
if the Sentinel's deployment is to be just ified as a defense against China. The
Chinese would have to decide to use
inter-continental ballistics missles to
launch the nuclear warheads, a nuclea r
approach into the United States against
which we would lnve the defensive capacity of the Sentinel. They would have
to choooe that means , rejecting the use
of off-coast submarines which, firing
nuclear weapons of low trajectory,
could eliminate seattle, Portland, San
Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore,
Washington, Norfolk. Charleston, S C.,
Miami, New Orleans, and Houston without activating Sentinel. Why would they
have to reject this latter approach by sea
and with intermediate range missiles
which would be clearly the more promising from their point of view? Because
the Sentinel is ineffective against missiles of insufficiently high trajectory. It
is amazing to what lengths of irrationality the Chinese are expected to go in
order to validate the deployment of this
system. Is it any wonder that President
Nixon has already rejected completely
this specious contention as a basis for
decision?
There are other arguments which are
made to justify the Sentinel deployment
arguments of greater or lesser fragility.
There is no need to reiterate them now.
Each of us has had the benefit of the
prolonged probing into the substance of
this issue.
I do not know what the President's rtecision wlll be in this mattor. The ·esponsibility which is his is grave and,
whatever he n;taY decide, it goes without
saying that it will be because he is persuaded that it is in the best interests of
of the Nation. However, the Senate, too,
has its responsibilities--its independent
responsibilities. We must arrive at our
own conclusions with respect to this
question.
As one Senator, as a Senator from
Montana, I have seen enough and heard
enough to be persuaded that it would
be inadvisable almost to the point of
tragedy to spend out of the constricted
financial resources of this GovernmPnt
the enormous cost of deployment of this
weapons system. To be sure, I can see as
warranted, a continuauce of research
and development on sentinel in the
hopes of a significant technological
breakthrough which might v:ive meanlng
to the weapon in later circumstances.
But to deploy the system now? We will
begin that deployment at a cost estimated at somewhere below $10 billion.
We will end, however, in the tens of billions if this deployment actually takes
place.
I see no safety for this Nation i,n bristling and burnished m issiles whether
they stand tall around rtetetiorating cities, or rise in the empty fields of an impoverished rural society I see, rather,
the beginnings of a deep trouble if we
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ever permit a driven pursuit of an elu sive security against throots abroad to
distract us from the rising tide of insecurity at home.
Mr. SYMINGTON. M·· Pr Ri ctent, w!ll
the Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. SYMINGTON. Let me con grat ulate the able majority leader on his pres entation as to why he opposes the proposed S entinel system. I am glad, also,
that I had the opportunity to hear the
fine address on this subject by the distinguished junior Senator from Maryland (Mr. MATHIAS).
I would ask the majority leader, is it
not true that the ADM system was first
offered a s a system to defend against
the Chinese; but that was changed when
it appear ed the system could not be sold
on that basis? Then after the clLies objected, it was changed. as the Senator
from Montana so well brought out. to
a system that would protect our missile
sites.
Is is not true that none of this has
anything to do with the missiles which
would be launched from our Polaris
submarines?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Th-at is correct. So
far as the Sentinel system being directed
against China was concemed, t hat, in
my opinion, was always a phony and unpalatable argument. I just could not
swallow iL. I could not believe it. I was
glad to note that President Nixon did not,
to use his words, "buy it" either.
Of course, during the debate last year,
it was brought out that instead of this
system being directed against China, it
was being directed against the Soviet
Union. This produced a popular outcry
when it was announced-not so much In
my part of the country; we are used to it.
When the country focused on tl1is issue
and asked what the ABM would look
like, or what the results would be--for
the first time we find the President
ordering a review. I honor the President
for what he has done. I recognize the fact
t hat the Director of the Disarmament
Agency, Girard Smith, a very fine m an
and a good G<Jvemment official, and Mr.
Melvin Laird, a former outstanding Representative. have indicated there is a
possibility that a really thin ABM sys tem will be put into operation. Despite
this fact and the rumors that it will be
put into operation around the missile
sites and not in the cities, I nevertheless,
have faith and confidence in the President of the United States ll'ho, I believe.
is keeping an open mind and is trying to
arrive at a decision after a thorough
review of all the facts. It is he who will
make the final decision, sometime next
wcPk. We cannot go beyond that PfJlnt.
Mr. SYMINGTON. We know that our
Polaris submarines have hundn' c!s of
nuclear missiles ready to be launched
against any aggressor, missilE's that are
a great deal more lethal lhan the Hiroshima bomb. In addition, is it not also
true that we have many thousands of
shorter range nuclear weapons all over
Europe, and in ot h er parts of the world .
which could come into action for the
defense of our country, or the country of
an ally. The proposed sentinel would
have nothing whatever to do with those
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thousands of warheads. Is that not cor-
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one. I also asked him at the time whether, po.;sessing more explosl\·e power than
if we reached an. agreement in this area, both sides dropped during all or World
rect'
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is cor- we had the ability to police the agree- War II. That was just one of 41 nuclear
rect. Many thousands of missiles. is the ment, whether our satellite reconnais- submarines.
sance would be adequate, and whether
correct way to state it.
I put the ques tion to t!1" c•·ew ,,d to
Mr. SYMINGTON. I again thank the an ABM system could be deployed In the the officers-to the officer , e , r lt ia l "
able majority leader and congratulate Soviet Union without detection.
of this submarine: "Let us role >lnv );"! e
him on his outstanding presentation of
He indicated at the time that they Suppose you are ordered to ntlack l\Ic •
this critically important issue.
could not deploy such a system without cow because they have attacked us. an•l
Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I also would detection. Just as in Cuba we were able suppose also that they not only ll:>vr t ll'
likP to corrunent on thP remarks of the to pick out what was being done there ABM missile system that they ha \ c
majority leader, which I believe have and progressively to follow it through partially deployed there, but they haye
been exceedingly helpful. I wonder photo reconnaissance the same could be everything we now know how to inst<~ll
whether I might ask a question of the done with ABM sites.
in the Sentinel system. They have a full
Senator from Montana on how we could
So that here we can draw up an agree- complex of Sprints, Spartan~':, softwear.
protect our ICBM bases or missiles in an- ment. the integrity of which can be pre- computers. and everything else. Woulct
other way. As I read the January 15 served with our present scientific and you be able to penetrate H ?" Th!'y said.
statement by the outgoing Secretary of technical capability It would not requlr<' ' 'Absolutely. All we would have to do Is
Deferu;e, Clark Clifford, he indicated that on-thr-sitc inspection in order to pre- exhaust them and then put up sufficient
for a relatively modest appropriation- serve the useful integrity of a useful firepower. Our reconnalssanee wnuld
! think it was $58 million-they could agreement.
know what their system is rnpnble of
superharden the missile sites and withMr MANSFIELD If the Srnalor will doing ami we woulrt always be sure lint
stand an impact of tremendous power. allow me to interrupt him Jet me say we had one more Even if everything we
As I understand it, within a quarter of that on the question of Mr. Foster and were able to put up were knocked down
a mile, they could withstand that kind his associate director or deputy, Adrian up to 100, the lOlst is all we need. So we
Fisher. this country ha~; been served well. would just exhaust the system." From
of blast.
Would this not be a better system, and I anticipate that we will be served just their standpoint, it was less expensive to
would not the majority leader support as well by the present Director, Girard build the extra offensive power than to
such a request for funds as a means of Smith. who has had previous experience build the defensive system.
protecting our ICBM bases, rather than in the State Department, who is a well
So the psychology the majority leader
going into the deployment of the system known, highly regarded and well re- ha~ pointed out, about this senseless and
spected individual, and who, in response reckless escalation of nuclear war capawe are now discussing?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, indeed. I so to a question before the Gore subcom- bilities. would be carried on because that
stated during the course of my remarks. mittee yesterday, slated ftatly that while is the military mentality, and is it their
I think it would be a cheap price to pay there had been a meeting of the Na- responsibility and obligation to always
for this additional protection. At the tional Security Council-and this is all build somethin~ to oliset the defensive
same time, as the Senator knows, those in public-absolutely no decision had weapons established. The same mentality
of us who have raised questions about been reached. It is that, in part, which that exists In the Pentagon can be asthe ABM syftem would like to see con- makes me hopeful that the President Is sumed to exist in the Soviet military
tinued research and development in that giving this his closest, personal attention service.
I thank the Senator for yielding.
field so that i: and when it became neces- and is trying to look at all the factors insary-and t 1at day might come--we volved, keeping in mind the need for
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator
would have the best possible weapons funds to take care of the decay, disin- from Illinois. I think this action-reaction
system avaihble.
tegration, violence, and crime which are process holds true not only in the field
Mr. PERCY. May I further ask whether occurring within the Nation itself. I feel of armaments, but also in this body as
the distingnlshed majority leader is for hi~. because he has a great and grave well.
aware of th•! feelings of the Honorable responsibility.
Mr MATHIAS Mr President, wlll the
William Fo~ter who, for 8 years after
To repeat: I know that no matter what Senator yield?
coming to the Disarmament Agency, his dPcis ion '>'! ill be, it will be because hP
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
probably bad as much to do with nego- thinks it will be in the best interests of
Mr MATHIAS I wish to thank the
tiating with the Sovie~ Union as any the security of this Nation .
distinguished majority leadE'r for his conAmerican, and what his attitude would
Mr. PERCY. One last question for the tinued efforts to shed l!p:ht in this area.
be as to wh• ther it would be wise for us majo ·ity leader, if I may. Docs It not not only by what he has said today but
to sit down with the Soviet Union now seem a bit strange that, in response LO what he has done over a Jonr: period of
to discuss :\ potential agreement, and the deployment of an ABM system in time. I was particularly struck by the
whether he might have expressed to the Moscow, which admittedly has been value of that part of his remarks tomajority leader an opinion as to whether slowed up or almost arre~;tcd now, we day which detailed the chronology of
a useful agreement could be reached in are going to build an ABM syst.em, as last thinking in the ABM field, as to the obthis area?
announced In some 20 cities, but we do jective of such a system, on the one hand
Mr. MAl\SFIELD. He has not ex- not propose to build it in Washington, directed against a Russian attack, on the
pressed that opinion to me, but I have D.C .. because, as I understand it, there is other hand directed against a Chinese
heard that he had expressed it to other not to be an ABM installation within 200 attack. I think by detailing the chronolmiles of our Nation's Capital?
Members.
ogy, as he has done, he made it very
I would throw the ball back to the SenIf It is so important to protect Chicago, clear that the proponents of the sysator from Illinois and ask him whether Detroit, and Pittsburgh In re.sponse to a tem arc not able to define what their
he could answer the question which he Moscow deployment, why, in the infinite objective is, over an extended period of
has just raised, because I believe he has wisdom of the Defense Department, have time, with any great preciR!on. This is
been a close friend of Mr. Foster for a they not chosen to protect the Nation's certainly a very major factor that has
Capital?
good many years.
to be considered before a decision to go
Mr. PERCY. It is my feeling that he
Mr. MANSFIELD. That is a good ques- ahead I am singling out this particular
was of that impression, that a very high tion. I do not know the answer.
aspect of the Senator's remarks. I am
priority should be placed on discussions
Mr. PERCY. May I just comment, not In any way overlooking the value
finally, that sever·al days ago I had the of the rest o! what h<> said. but I think
with the Soviet Union.
I believe that I could quote the former privilege of going out on a nuclear sub- the question of where we are aiming has
VIce President of the United States, In marine for the first time. I spent 3 years to be c.lecided conclusively, nnd until it
a conversation with him in which I asked in Naval Avat!on, but I never had been is. we cannot make any intelligent dehim, during a briefing at the White- in a submarine. I had the opportunity to cision.
House, when I first came to the Senate, spend a leisurely period of some hours in
Mr MANSFIELD. J apprt>icnte the reto show us why we should not deploy the wardroom of that nuclear submarine, marks of the able St>nator I am hopeful
an ABM system and why it would not one which carried the potential. with all that the discussion t 1is afternoon. and
make any sense for the country to build the Polaris missiles it had on board, of the discussions over the past several
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weeks--discussions which, I want to emphasize, have been carried on in a very
statesmanlike manner and on a very high
plane--will be given the consideration
which many of us feel they wan-ant. It
is my belief that what has been said on
both sides of the aisle will be given that
attention, and, hopefully, will play a
part before a final decision is reached.
Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I do not
know what decision the President may
make on the deployment of the Sentinel
ABM system as was proposed by the administration of President Johnson, or
some modification of that system. Whatever decision is made, I have no doubt
that President Nixon will act in what he
considers to be in the security and best
interest of the United States.
I argue today that the Presid~nt should
not order a deployment of an ABM system. Since last year when the Congress
provided the original funds for deployment, there has been a continuing and
more informed debate in the Congress
and in the country as to its necessity. I
believe that the process of consultation
with the Congress, and of education and
open debate in our country, should go on
until all facts available have been presented to the Congress and the country
before a decision is made to deploy. We
do not yet know all the facts.
My second reason is that deployment
should be delayed until the President has
had an opportunity to determine whether
the Soviet Union will enter negotiations
and negotiate in good faith on the control
of defensive and offensive nuclear weapons systems. There is no surer way to
test the fidelity of the Soviet offer to negotiate a cessation of the nuclear arrns
race. The clearly understood ability of
both the United States and the Soviet
Union that each has the assured ability
to destroy each other has been the deterrent against nuclear war and is the
basis for a possible settlement. It is the
only kind of "bargaining from strength"
that has meaning.
Is there some new element of danger
which we do not yet know which requires
the early deployment of some defensive
system? And it is to this question that I
address myself chiefly today.
Over the past year, the Senate and
public have become aware that the rationale offered for the Sentinel ABM system has been confusing and contradictory, whether described as a protection
against a Soviet Union or Communist
Chinese nuclear attack. This was crisply
clarified during the first days of hearings
held by the Senate Foreign Relations
Subcommittee on Disarmament under
Senator GoRE, by the testimony of three
of the country's most informed nuclear
missile scientists, Dr. Hans Bethe, Dr. J.
P. Ruina, and Dr. Daniel Fink. Their
testimony confirmed the position that
former Secretaries of Defense McNamara and Clifford and Dr. Foster,
Chief of Research and Development of
the Department of Defense, had stoutly
maintained that the Sentinel system
would provide no protection against a
massive Soviet attack. Dr. Bethe and Dr.
Ruina gave little support for the argument that it would provide limited protection against China or that there was
credibility in reasoning that such attack
might occur.

Senator RICHARD RUSSELL'S instinctive
judgment that the Chinese rationale for
the Sentinel system is not credible is
also held by these two scientists and by
many in the Senate and throughout the
country. You will recall that Senator
RussELL said in hearings before the Senate Appropriations Committee last year:
This concept of a mlssle attack orlglnatlng
In China any time In the near future seems
to me to be very remote. The Chinese are
not completely crazy; they are not going to
attack us with four or five mlsslles when
they know we have the capab111ty of virtually destroying their entire country. They
wm fight us wi th conventional weapons, 1f
we do have a wa r, ln order to run us out of
Korea or some slmllar area. All of this talk
about preparing for a Chinese mlsslle attack, In my judgment, ls just to cover up
an admission of error In not starting an
antl-ball1stlc m!sslle sys tem against Soviet
Russia any earller than we clld.

Later in the same testimony, the distinguished chairman said:
I don't think there Is any question but
what they will proceed to develop one. It
Is Inconceivable to me that they would fire
the first ones they had against this country
and know they would be destroyed If they
did so. I am glad we are going ahead, you
understand, but I don't !Ike people to think
I am being kidded by this talk of defense
against a. Chinese nuclear threat because I
don't think that the Chinese are likely to
attack us with an Intercontinental ballistic
missile at any time In the near future .
I am delighted that the executive branch
finally decided to proceed with the deployment of even this "thin" ABM system, because It Is the first step toward the deployment of the complete system that I think
Is required. I have often said that I felt that
the first country to deploy an etrectlve ABM
system and an e!Iectlve ASW system Is going
to control this world mllltarlly.
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sive system. If the Unitrd St.ntes doP~ :-;o
without new fnets to justify lrnnwrllntr
danger, it could br rrsponsible for Lli<'
commencement of n new stn~o:(' In lllP nu clear arms race-It st1we that would bP
matched by the Soviet Union and ll continuing nuclear race which could become
irreversible.
Out of all the testimony heard ye ..,trrday, I think it very important that the
Congress, the news media, and the people
of our country remember the statementq
of the three scientists on this issue. Is
there such a present danger as to require
the deployment of either the proposed
Sentinel system, or the deployment of
Sprint or similar missiles at our ICBM
sites, before negotiations occur? Both Dr.
Bethe and Dr. Ruina gave their opinion
that there is not such a danger. They
suggested that before the deployment of
Sprint at missile sites there should be
greater study of the type of defense that
should be provided. I believe that Dr.
Fink said with respect to the necessity of
immediate deployment of Sprint at missile sites, that he would want to study
the question further.
Senator SYMINGTON has spoken about
the enormous costs involved in the deployment of an ABM system. If we do
not enter into negotiations and conclude
an arms limitation agreement, our country w1ll face an annual investment o!
offensive and defensive missiles in the
tens of billion of dollars. If this expenditure is necessary for the security of our
country, I will support it. But we must
recognize that both the United States
and the Soviet Union have the capacity
to keep up with the other in offensive
and defensive weapons. With a continuing nuclear arms race we will end up at
some later stage no further ahead, and
we will be less secure because of the
proliferation of United States and Soviet
nuclear weapons in the world.
Because of the enormous stakes involved. the costs, our security and human
life, I hope the President will defer deployment until he can determine whether
negotiations leading to a limitation of
the nuclear arms race will be successful.
It would be in harmony with his stated
desire and purpose to be a peacemaker.
He has, I believe, an opportunity that
perhaps no other President has had before him . It is the chance to halt the nuclear arms race.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that three articles that appeared in
the Wall Street Journal, the Washington
Star, and the New York Times on the
hearings held by the Foreign Relations
Committee yesterday be placed in the
RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.
There being no objection, the material
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:

The three witnesses raised another
key issue in their testimony which must
be considered. It is relevant because I
believe the issue is .one that the administration is presently considering, and
upon which it may base its recommendations to the Congress. The scientists
agreed that i he deployment of the radars and the Sprints to protect the sites
of our offensive ICBM missiles would
provide needed protect!.on if the Soviet
Union increased the number and quality
of its offensive missile forces by the development of MIRV, FOBS, and related
offensive weapons. The capacity of such
offensive weapons to neutralize our
ICBM missiles and destroy our offensive
ICBM capability would destroy or degrade our deterrent.
I comment on this issue by noting that
the United States is also proceeding with
the development of MIRV, and that it
posseses over 600 missiles positioned in
our polaris submarines. We have not
been told that the Soviet Union is deploying any missiles such as Sprint to
protect its ICBM bases.
I From the Wall Street J ournnl , Mar. 5, 19691
Unless there are new facts which would
THE GREAT ABM DEBATE
upset the existing assured balance, that
Were Its lmpllca.tlons not so grrwe, the
make it imperative for the United States great debate over the antl-balllst!c mlss!le
to deploy such a site defensive system would be somewhat comical. At first blush,
now, and 1f there are such facts, they It Is hard to believe that a number of comshould be made clear to the Congress petent men, presumably proceeding from the
and the American people. I do not believe same data, can arrive at d!runetr!cnlly opooncluslons.
that the United States should initiate the posed
In any event, the Center for the Study of
deployment of a Sentinel system whether Democratic
Institutions hns performed a useas proposed by the past administration ful service in publishing a microcosm of the
as an area of defense to protect our cities debate. in the form of statements and a disand industries, or a missile site defen- cussion by experts and others at least fam!liar

